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Abstract 
 
In this study, we investigate the financial and monetary policy responses to oil price 
shocks using Structural VAR methodology. We distinguish between net oil-importing 
and net oil-exporting countries. Since the 80s, a significant number of empirical studies 
have been published investigating the effect of oil prices on macroeconomic and financial 
variables. Most of these studies though, do not make a distinction between oil-importing 
and oil-exporting economies. Overall, our results indicate that the level of inflation in 
both net oil-exporting and net oil-importing countries is significantly affected by oil price 
innovations. Furthermore, we find that the response of interest rates to an oil price shock 
depends heavily on the monetary policy regime of each country. Finally, stock markets 
exhibit a negative response to increased oil prices for almost all cases. We find evidence 
that the magnitude of stock market responses to oil price shocks is higher for the newly 
established and/or less liquid stock markets.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the financial and monetary policy responses to oil 
price shocks for five European countries; namely, the UK, Norway, Germany, France and 
Portugal. We also consider Russia, as it constitutes a key energy supplier of Europe. In 
particular, both the level of inflation and interest rates will be used as proxies of the 
monetary policy response to oil price shocks, while stock market returns will serve as a 
measure of the financial response to these shocks. We distinguish between net oil 
importing and net oil exporting countries.  
It is worth noting that very little work has appeared with regard to monetary policy and 
oil prices for Russia, while at the same time most papers usually examine the effect of oil 
price shocks on the macroeconomic aggregates and not the effect on monetary policy. 
The selection of countries satisfies three main concerns of the authors. Primarily this is a 
study related to European continent countries, which have not been extensively studied in 
the past. In addition, given that the sample consists of two net oil exporting countries 
(Norway and Russia) and four net oil importing countries (UK, France, Germany and 
Portugal), it allows for a thorough comparison of their financial and monetary responses 
to oil price shocks. Relatively little research has been conducted on the different effects 
of an oil price shock on the two aforementioned groups of countries (see, inter alia, 
Korhonen and Ledyaeva, 2010; Bjornland, 2009; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Jimenez-
Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). Finally, there is a special focus of this study on possible 
diverse oil price effects between the traditional stock markets, such as UK, France and 
Germany and the newly established and/or less liquid stock markets, such as Russia, 
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Norway and Portugal. Thus motivated, our study elucidates three important aspects 
which have not been extensively examined in the past. 
The extensive literature has so far addressed several issues related to the impact of oil 
price innovations for member countries of the G7, OPEC and OECD (see, inter alia, 
Miller and Ratti, 2009; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 
2005). Prominent among these issues is the investigation of the effects of an oil price 
shock on various macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, consumer price index, interest 
rates, industrial production and unemployment.  
Furthermore, authors such as Sadorsky (1999), Jones and Kaul (1996) and Haung, 
Masulis and Stoll (1996) investigate the relationship between oil prices and stock market 
returns. They all conclude that oil price changes are important determinants of stock 
market returns. Economic theory suggests that any asset price is determined by the 
expected discounted cash flows of that asset. Therefore, an oil price increase would 
inflate costs and profits would eventually decrease, undermining shareholders value. In 
this regard, stock prices will tend to decrease. However, the aforementioned studies do 
not examine whether the relationship between oil prices and stock market performance is 
different for oil-importing and oil-exporting countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly discuss the 
theory underpinning the transmission mechanisms among oil, inflation, interest rates, and 
the stock market. We then discuss existing work in the field under consideration, 
documenting the relationship between oil prices, the economy and stock markets. We 
then turn to a brief description of the Structural VAR model and the presentation of our 
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dataset. Finally, empirical results are outlined and discussed, before a conclusion is 
reached. 
 
2. Theoretical context of transmission mechanisms 
In the case of an oil-exporting country, the effects of an oil price increase are expected to 
be positive, as initially, the income of this country is likely to increase (Bjornland, 2009; 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005). Consequently, both consumption and investment 
are expected to rise in magnitude and this in turn will lead to an increase in the 
production of services and goods, as well as, to a contraction of unemployment. Stock 
markets are expected to rise as a result of a prosperous investing environment. This 
period of growth is likely to come to an end though, as demand-side inflation will 
eventually make its appearance (Bjornland, 2009; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 
2005).  
On the other hand, an oil-importing country immediately faces supply driven inflation in 
the case of a positive oil price shock and cost of production is expected to rise because 
oil, in its various forms, is one of the most basic inputs of production (Arouri and 
Nguyen, 2010; LeBlanc and Chinn, 2004; Hooker, 2002; Abel and Bernanke, 2001; 
Backus and Crucini, 2000; Kim and Loungani, 1992; Barro, 1984). Increased costs will 
be passed on to consumers, consumer prices will rise and this in turn will result in 
relatively low levels of aggregate demand; see, for example, Abel and Bernanke (2001), 
Hamilton (1996), Hamilton (1988) and Barro (1984). 
Producers are likely to pass the increased cost of production to final consumption either 
by increasing product prices or by confining production itself. In any case, 
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unemployment is expected to rise and consumption to fall (Lardic and Mignon, 2006; 
Brown and Yucel, 2002; Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001; Caruth, Hooker and Osward, 
1998). Stock markets are expected to decline as a result of a negative investing 
environment (Sadorsky, 1999; Jones and Kaul, 1996; Haung et al, 1996). In short, this 
country may very well enter a period of economic downturn.  
Eventually it all comes down to monetary policy (Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997). 
Based on Taylor’s rule (1993), an increase in the short term interest rates might be a 
suitable treatment for the demand-side inflation in an oil-exporting country. If the central 
bank decides to raise the short term interest rates, the expected confinement of 
consumption and investment will eventually restrain inflation. This rise, however, will 
negatively affect stock market performance. On the other hand, a decrease in the interest 
rates will probably be a suitable decision for the oil-importing country, providing demand 
stimulus. More specifically, we anticipate that the period of distress will come to an end, 
as investments and consumption become cheaper. Such a decision can have a positive 
effect on the stock market. 
Although this may seem an obvious transmission mechanism, many argue that certain 
conditions must hold in order for the monetary policy to have the desirable effects. For 
example, Gali and Gerlter (2007) proponent that central bank’s credibility is essential for 
the success of the monetary policy. Central bank’s credibility is linked with the ability of 
the bank to manage private sector’s expectations on future monetary policy decisions. In 
addition, Laopodis (2009) argues that the effects of monetary policy decisions on stock 
markets are stronger during bearish than bullish periods. However, Bjornland and 
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Leitemo (2009) report a bidirectional rather than a unidirectional relationship between 
monetary policy and stock market performance.   
It is also important not to lose sight of the fact that such monetary policy decisions will 
be made only by countries whose primary concern is to regulate inflation. Granville and 
Mallick (2006) suggest that only mature economies are trying to regulate inflation using 
interest rates. Other economies, mainly emerging, are trying to regulate their exchange 
rate fluctuations, instead. 
On the other hand, Svensson (1999) voices the opinion that open economies can induce 
real exchange rate movements to affect inflation, via the aggregate demand channel for 
domestic goods. Such practice is expected to result in a quicker inflation response. 
 
3. Background of the Study 
3.1. Oil price effect on the economy 
Mounting evidence suggests that oil prices have a strong influence on the economy. 
Various authors in the past have examined the effects of oil prices on industrial 
production and inflation, suggesting a negative effect on industrial production and a 
positive effect on inflation (see, inter alia, Tang, Wu and Zhang, 2010; Du, He and Wei, 
2010; Miller and Ratti, 2009; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Ciner 2001; Haung et al, 1996; 
Ferderer, 1996; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986; Burbridge and Harrison, 1984; Hamilton, 
1983). An increased oil price would inflate production costs, subsequently resulting in 
lower production and thus lower expected earnings (Jones, Lelby and Paik, 2004).  
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) find that there is a bidirectional relationship 
between oil price movements and macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation. They also 
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point out the different effect that oil prices exercise on oil-importing economies and oil-
exporting economies; suggesting that on one hand, an oil price increase could be 
beneficiary for the oil-exporting country whereas, on the other hand, it could be 
detrimental for the oil-importing country. Similar findings were presented by Mendoza 
and Vera (2010), Korhonen and Ledyaeva (2010), Bjornland (2009) and Lescaroux and 
Mignon (2008). Cunado and Perez de Gracia (2005) suggest that the effect of oil prices 
on macroeconomic indicators tends to be different when oil prices are converted in 
domestic currency rather than in dollar terms. Barsky and Kilian (2004), on the other 
hand, argue that an oil price shock does not necessarily lead to an immediate effect on the 
economy. 
Other studies have shown, though, a structural break in the relationship between oil 
prices and macroeconomic indicators after the 1980s. More specifically, they suggest that 
oil price changes do not significantly affect inflation and thus they are not the main 
source for economic downturn, as Hamilton had suggested back in 1983. This structural 
break can be partly attributed to the recent trend in national monetary policy formulation 
being focused on the confrontation of inflationary pressures (Lescaroux and Mignon, 
2008; Blanchard and Gali, 2007; Bernanke et al, 1997). The International Energy Agency 
(2006) argues that when in a state of economic growth, a country is not likely to face the 
negative impacts of an oil price increase, in respect to inflation. This is mainly due to the 
fact that increasing productivity and investment enable firms to absorb production input 
costs.  
Through the lens of monetary policy response to oil price shocks, central banks are faced 
with a trade-off between inflation and output (Castillo, Montoro and Tuesta, 2010).  
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Bernanke et al (1997) argue that a contractionary monetary policy is not necessarily the 
optimal solution, since it could aggravate the negative effects of these shocks. In 
particular, they suggest that the negative effects of oil price shocks that the US economy 
experienced during the period of late 70s to early 90s, should be mainly attributed to the 
monetary policy response of the Federal Reserve Bank, rather than to the oil price shock 
itself. Had the FED assumed a neutral response (i.e. no alteration of the funds rate) the 
output contraction would have been substantially less. This analysis is in line with an 
earlier study by Bohi (1989). However, Hamilton and Herrera (2004) argue that the 
relative contribution of monetary policy and oil price shocks to economic developments 
may not be as effective as Bernanke et al (1997) have suggested. In addition, Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (2000), as well as, DeLong (1997) propose that different monetary 
policy rules could result in substantially different inflation responses to oil price shocks.  
At the other end of the spectrum, considering that oil price shocks could be regarded as 
purely monetary shocks in nature, active monetary policy is then required not only to 
subdue inflationary pressures but also to ensure minimum contractionary effects on 
output (Castillo et al, 2010; Romer and Romer, 1989).            
Jimenez-Rodriguez (2009) provides another angle on the relationship between oil prices 
and the economy. She argues that the effects of oil price shocks should be considered 
along with the economic environment at the time of the shock. Oil price shocks during 
stable economic periods would generate a higher impact on the economy compared to 
similar shocks during turbulent periods. 
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3.2. Oil price effect on the stock market 
Authors argue that oil prices could have both a direct and an indirect negative influence 
on the stock market performance. The direct effect can be explained by the fact that oil 
price shocks can be considered as a risk factor for financial markets and thus a positive 
oil price shock may induce a decrease in share prices (Jones and Kaul, 1996). On the 
other hand, an indirect negative effect can also be justified. Evidence from the previous 
section (section 3.1.) suggests that higher oil prices lead to higher inflation. Higher 
inflation rates can, in turn, cause a negative effect on the stock market.  
This negative relationship between oil prices and stock returns has also been documented 
by Filis (2010), Chen (2009), Miller and Ratti (2009), Driesprong, Jacobsen and Maat 
(2008), Nandha and Faff (2008), O'Neill, Penm and Terrell (2008), Park and Ratti (2008), 
Bachmeier (2008), Ciner (2001) and Gjerde and Sættem (1999). Nandha and Brooks 
(2009) suggest that the effect of oil prices on stock market returns depends on the 
country’s characteristics and the sector of the economy. Sadorsky (1999), who have also 
reached the same conclusion and suggest that apart from oil price changes, oil price 
volatility has an impact on stock returns, as well. Similar findings were reported by a 
recent paper by Malik and Ewing (2009), who also suggested that the oil price volatility 
causes negative effects on stock market returns. Oberndorfer (2009) seconds that opinion 
in his study of the effect of oil price volatility on European stock markets.  
A slightly different approach is adopted by Haung et al (1996) who examine the 
relationship between oil future price returns and US stock returns. In agreement with 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), they provide evidence that oil future prices tend to influence 
oil companies’ stock returns but not the overall market. 
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All aforementioned studies mainly concern oil-importing countries. Pertaining to oil-
exporting countries, Arouri and Rault (2009) suggest that a positive oil price shock has a 
positive impact on the stock market performance. Similar results are documented by 
Bashar (2006). However, Al-Fayoumi (2009) finds no evidence that oil price shocks 
affect stock markets in oil-exporting countries. 
Several studies focus on the origin of the oil price shock in order to understand and 
interpret the effects of oil price shocks on stock markets (see, inter alia, Hamilton, 
2009a,b; Kilian, 2009; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Terzian, 
1985). Hamilton (2009a), for example, draws a distinction line between the sources of an 
oil price shock. According to him, an oil price shock could either originate from the 
industrialisation of countries such as China (demand-side shock) or from the lack of an 
immediate response of oil-supply to a large scale increase in oil-demand (supply-side 
shock). Kilian (2009), on the other hand, suggests that there are three sources of oil price 
shocks, namely, aggregate demand-side shock, precautionary demand-side shock and 
supply-side shock. Aggregate demand-side shocks occur due to global business cycle’s 
fluctuations, precautionary demand shocks occur due to the uncertainty of future oil 
supply based on the expectations of future oil demand, and supply-side shocks are 
exogenous shocks and occur due to reduction of crude oil availability. Kilian and Park 
(2009) argue that demand-side oil price shocks influence stock prices more than the 
supply-side oil price shocks.  
Kilian and Park (2007) show that demand driven shocks cause negative effects on US 
stock market returns. However, oil price increases, due to global economic expansion, 
tend to have a significant positive effect on stock returns. In the same line of reasoning, 
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Hamilton (2009a) argues that demand-side shocks deriving from the industrialisation of 
countries such as China could have a significant positive impact on the stock markets. 
A quite different approach on the investigation of oil price effect on stock markets is 
followed by Filis, Degiannakis and Floros (2011) and Bharn and Nikolova (2010). In 
particular, these studies used measures of dynamic correlation between stock market and 
oil prices. They provide evidence of asymmetric behaviour of the correlation between 
stock market returns and oil price returns, which depends on the source of the oil price 
shock (i.e. demand-side shock or supply-side shock). 
Contrary to the above, part of the literature suggests that there is no relationship between 
oil price innovations and stock markets (see, inter alia, Jammazi and Aloui, 2010; 
Apergis and Miller, 2009; Cong, Wei, Jiao and Fan, 2008).  
It should also be noted that the majority of these studies do not include both oil-importing 
and oil-exporting countries in their sample. Thus the current research bridges this gap by 
including both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries in the sample.  
 
4. Methodology and Data Description 
4.1. Methodology 
We examine the dynamic relationship among the growth rates of oil prices (OIL), the 
consumer price index (INF), interest rates (INT) and stock market index (IND), in two 
net oil-exporting countries (Norway and Russia) and four net oil-importing countries 
(UK, Germany, France and Portugal), by employing a Structural VAR model, separately 
for each country. We also investigate the transmission mechanism of stochastic shocks of 
these series. 
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The structural representation of the VAR model of order p takes the following general 
form: 
  
(1) 
 
where ty  is a m × 1 vector of endogenous variables,    are m × m autoregressive 
coefficient matrices, εt is an  m × 1 vector of structural disturbances, assumed to have 
zero covariance and be serially uncorrelated.    is a m × m matrix containing the 
contemporaneous relations among the variables. In order to get the reduce form of model 
(1) we multiply both sides of the equation with   
  
. Let et be the reduced form errors, 
where  , assumed to be white noise processes. The structural disturbances can 
be derived by imposing suitable restrictions on . With reference to section 2 we impose 
the following exclusion restrictions in our model: 
 
 
To proceed to the estimation of the reduced form of model (1), it is first necessary to 
establish the stationarity of the variables. The ADF and PP unit root tests with intercept 
only and trend and intercept suggest that all variables are I(0)
1
. The order of each model 
was identified using the Akaike Information Criterion
2
. For almost all countries (UK, 
France, Germany and Russia) the AIC suggested a VAR model of order 6. For the rest of 
                                                 
1 Results can be obtained upon request. 
2 Results can be obtained upon request. 
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the countries (Portugal and Norway) the lag-length that was suggested by AIC was 5. In 
this regard, we have decided to use six lags for all countries. 
 
4.2. Data Description 
We use monthly data from 1991:01 to 2010:04 for UK, France, Germany and Norway. 
For Russia the data used are from 1996:04 to 2010:04
3
 and for Portugal from 1995:02 to 
2010:04
4
. The stock market indices used are the SBF120 (France), DAX 30 (Germany), 
PS120 (Portugal), FTSE100 (UK), RTS (Russia) and OBX 25 (Norway). We also take 
each country’s CPI, which is seasonally adjusted with the same base year (2000). The 
interest rates used in this study are the 1-month interbank rates of each country. For oil 
we use the Brent crude oil prices, converted in local currency. Brent crude oil was 
chosen, as a proxy of world oil price, due to the fact that this type of oil represents the 
60% of the world oil daily consumption (Maghyereh, 2004). We convert oil prices into 
real oil prices by taking into consideration the exchange rate between the currency
5
 of 
each country and the dollar over the period of study and the consumer price indices. 
Interest rates and stock market prices are expressed in real terms, as well, taking into 
consideration the corresponding CPI index. 
The stock market prices and interest rates were collected from Datastream®, consumer 
price indices were collected from the Eurostat and the national statistical services of the 
selected countries and oil prices in dollar terms were extracted from Energy Information 
Administration. All variables are expressed in logarithms. 
                                                 
3
 We do not consider any available data prior to 1996, as during this time Russia was in a transition period, 
which was characterised by a volatile behaviour of the variables under consideration. This is in line with 
Granville and Mallick (2010). 
4
 Data availability issues have imposed constraints to our sample period. 
5
 Exchange rates were collected from Pacific Exchange Rate Service. 
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5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1. Preliminary Tests  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the series. It can be observed that OIL is 
showing the higher amplitude on all countries except Russia, whose stock market (IND) 
and interest rates (INT) exhibit greater volatility than oil prices. This is mainly due to the 
fact that Russia has a newly established stock market. CPI exhibits the lowest amplitude 
on all countries. Furthermore, we can observe that the INT is negative on all countries, 
which shows the declining nature of interest rates during the period under consideration 
in this study.  
 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
All variables have a mean very close to zero. However, there is an indication of non-
normally distributed series, as J-B statistic is significant in all cases. This is probably due 
to non-linearities involved in the growth rate fluctuations. This non-normality is also 
evident from the kurtosis and skewness coefficients.  
 
5.2. Structural VAR results – Impulse Response Functions 
The purpose of the VAR-family models (including the SVAR framework) is mainly to 
examine the dynamic adjustments of each of the involved variables to exogenous 
stochastic structural shocks (see, inter alia, Bjornland and Leitemo, 2009; Kilian and 
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Park, 2009; Papapetrou, 2001; Burbridge and Harrison, 1984). Thus, as space is limited, 
we only present the analysis of the impulse response functions
6
. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
[TABLE 2] 
Starting from the net oil-importing countries; a positive oil price shock in Germany 
results in an immediate positive response of inflation. This effect decreases over time, 
until it becomes negligible 10 months later. However, since the forth month after the oil 
price shock, the response of inflation is at a minimum. The interest rates react 
immediately and positively to the inflationary pressure. On the other hand, the interest 
rates react positively to the oil price increase with one month delay. This delay can be 
attributed to the time that is required for an oil price shock to propagate its effects to the 
economy. The stock market initially has a negative response to the oil price shock, 
oscillating negatively for a period of 8 months before starting to fade out. In addition, 
inflation and interest rates seem to exercise a negative impact on the stock market, as 
these are depicted by the impulse response functions. Kaul and Seyhun (1990) proponent 
that the effect of inflation on stock market performance could be triggered by output 
shocks caused by disturbances in crude oil prices. Past studies have also documented 
these relationships (see, inter alia, Miller and Ratti, 2009; Nandha and Faff, 2008; Park 
and Ratti, 2008 for the effect of oil prices on the stock market; Cologni and Manera, 
2008; Omrana, 2003; Flannery and Protopapadakis, 2002 for the effect of inflation on the 
stock market). The same pattern can also be observed in all remaining net oil-exporting 
countries, namely France, UK and Portugal. Our results are in line with economic theory, 
                                                 
6
 The actual VAR(6) coefficient tables are available upon request. 
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in the sense that such developments are expected in countries that employ an inflation 
targeting monetary policy rule.  
However, particularly for UK and Portugal, we notice that it takes two months for the 
positive response of inflation to the oil price shock to reach a peak, before it eventually 
exhibits a decreasing pace. Hence, we can argue that the oil price shock is more persistent 
in UK and Portugal, as opposed to France and Germany. France and Germany exhibit 
their potential to battle inflationary pressures (due to oil price increases) immediately, 
whereas delays are observed in UK and Portugal.  
Turning to the net oil-exporting countries; a positive oil price shock in Russia causes a 
positive response of inflation; a response which is immediate and of high magnitude, 
suggesting demand-side inflation (see, inter alia, Bjornland, 2009; LeBlanc and Chinn, 
2004; Hooker 2002). The effect of oil price increases on inflation disappears rapidly (one 
to two months later) and eventually becomes negligible eight months after the shock. 
Furthermore, an immediate and negative response of interest rates to a positive oil price 
shock can be reported. Interest rates respond negatively and immediately on inflationary 
pressures, as well. Admittedly, these results lack theoretical flavour in the sense that they 
are not supported by any prevailing economic argument. Nonetheless, a possible 
explanation of these responses could be found in the monetary policy targeting that 
Russia is engaged with. In particular, Russia’s monetary policy is not inflation targeting; 
instead, it has an exchange rate targeting regime. Increased oil prices trigger immediate 
transfer of wealth to Russia from foreign countries. This, in turn, results in lower interest 
rates, due to the increased availability of money in the economy. To further our analysis 
regarding Russia, its stock market initially responds negatively to the positive oil price 
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shock; this response, however, becomes positive from the second month onwards and 
eventually dies out completely in about two years time. In addition, stock market 
responds negatively to both inflation and interest rates shocks. The negative relationship 
that runs from inflation to the stock market, suggests that high inflation leads the stock 
market to lower levels. Similar conclusions were presented in other studies, such as 
Omrana (2003), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) and Siklos and Kwok (1999). 
As far as Norway is concerned, a positive oil price shock causes a positive response from 
inflation which is rather low in magnitude and eventually becomes negligible three 
months later. Furthermore, we cannot identify any significant effect of oil on interest 
rates at least not until four months have passed. Interest rates though, respond 
immediately and positively to inflationary pressures and a peak is reached by the seventh 
month. The magnitude of this response, however, is rather low. Finally, on one hand, we 
have a positive impact of the oil price shock on the stock market (similarly with 
Bjornland, 2009; Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2005), whereas, on the other hand, the 
stock market reacts negatively on inflationary pressures and interest rates developments. 
Overall, we find evidence suggesting that oil prices affect the level of inflation in both net 
oil-exporting and net oil-importing countries, which is in contrast to what Hamilton 
(2008), Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) and Blanchard and Gali (2007) have suggested, 
i.e. that from 1980s onwards inflationary pressures cannot be attributed to oil price 
increases, since the importance of oil, as a production input, gradually decreases.  
Furthermore, we find that the response of interest rates to an oil price shock depends 
heavily on the monetary policy regime of each country. We observe that countries with 
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inflation targeting regime, exhibit an inclination towards restricting inflationary pressures 
(due to oil price increases) by immediately increasing interest rates. 
On general principles, stock markets exhibit a negative response to increased oil prices. 
The only exception is the Norwegian stock market, an exception somewhat expected, as 
Norway is a net oil-exporter. 
Finally, our results distinguish between responses of traditional and newly established 
and/or thin stock markets in oil price shocks. In particular, it is evident that the magnitude 
of stock market responses to oil price shocks is higher for the newly established and/or 
thin stock markets (such as Russia and Norway). This finding can be attributed to the fact 
that thin stock markets tend to overestimate the workings of economic activity.    
 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the financial and monetary policy responses to oil price 
changes in six countries, namely UK, Norway, Russia, Germany, France and Portugal; 
corresponding to two net oil-exporting countries (Norway and Russia) and four net oil-
importing countries (Germany, France, UK and Portugal).  
Overall, we find evidence suggesting that the level of inflation in both net oil-exporting 
and net oil-importing countries is affected by oil prices. A finding which poses a 
contradiction to what Hamilton (2008), Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) and Blanchard and 
Gali (2007) have suggested, i.e. that from 1980s onwards inflationary pressures cannot be 
attributed to oil price increases. Furthermore, we find that the response of interest rates to 
an oil price shock depends heavily on the monetary policy regime of each country. In 
addition, stock markets exhibit a negative response to increased oil prices. The only 
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exception is the Norwegian stock market, which is somewhat expected, as Norway is a 
net oil-exporting country. 
Finally, our results distinguish between responses of traditional and newly established 
and/or thin stock markets to oil price shocks. In particular, it is evident that the magnitude 
of stock market responses to oil price shocks is higher for the newly established and/or 
less liquid stock markets (such as Russia and Norway). This can be attributed to the fact 
that these stock markets tend to overestimate the workings of real economic activity.    
Further research in the field should incorporate the origin of an oil price shock; that is 
whether it comes from the supply-side or the demand-side. Finally, further study could 
examine the asymmetric effects of oil prices on monetary policy and stock market 
responses. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for oil prices, inflation, interest rates and stock market 
    Series   Mean   St. Dev.   Skewness   Kurtosis   J-B Stat. 
UK  OIL   0.002   0.004   1.209   12.721   948.959* 
  INF   0.004   0.043  -0.731   5.523   80.417* 
  INT   0.006   0.106  -0.045   3.938   8.413* 
  IND  -0.014  0.059  -2.915  16.840  2170.882* 
             
France  OIL   0.001   0.001   0.446   4.314   23.867* 
  INF   0.004   0.059  -0.765   5.591   85.623* 
  INT   0.007   0.104  -0.195   4.201   15.101* 
  IND  -0.011  0.084  0.643  13.468  1070.758* 
             
Germany  OIL   0.001   0.002   0.252   15.254   1422.681* 
  INF   0.005   0.065  -1.064   7.454   230.191* 
  INT   0.006   0.104  -0.173   4.194   14.636* 
  IND  -0.012  0.064  -1.711  9.904  571.665* 
             
Norway  OIL   0.001   0.004   0.637   7.037   114.292* 
  INF   0.011   0.061  -0.867   3.969   25.186* 
  INT   0.010   0.102  -0.382   3.896   8.857* 
  IND  -0.007  0.086  -0.461  8.441  293.237* 
             
Portugal  OIL   0.002   0.003   0.434   3.712   9.883* 
  INF   0.007   0.056  -0.202   3.734   5.569* 
    INT    0.008    0.101   -0.359    4.103    13.742* 
  IND  -0.016  0.071  -1.547  9.091  356.009* 
             
Russia  OIL  -0.001   0.033   0.375   66.294   2242.971* 
  INF   0.021   0.139  -0.807   5.635   60.741* 
  INT   0.024   0.127   1.183   9.717   323.433* 
  IND  -0.012  0.207  1.126  5.219  71.265* 
* significant at 5% level.             
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Table 2: Structural VAR model: Impulse Response Functions (time required for the shock to be absorbed) 
        UK  France  Germany  Norway  Portugal  Russia 
Response of OIL to shocks from  OIL  24  26  22  25  36  23 
  INF  26  30  25  26  34  22 
  INT  25  27  23  22  32  20 
  IND  16  26  27  26  41  19 
               
Response of INF to shocks from  OIL  22  25  25  30  41  25 
  INF  32  30  29  31  47  26 
  INT  28  26  31  27  38  21 
  IND  27  21  30  32  40  26 
               
Response of INT to shocks from  OIL  23  27  19  30  35  25 
  INF  20  34  25  32  32  26 
  INT  24  22  22  29  33  24 
    IND   26  18  24  31  38  26 
               
Response of IND to shocks from  OIL  18  27  22  25  37  20 
  INF  21  32  16  23  31  22 
  INT  16  31  19  26  34  21 
  IND  18  24  24  26  30  22 
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Figure 
 
Figure 1: Structural VAR model: Impulse Response Functions                                                    
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Germany 
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